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The eﬀect of European integration on long-term growth of the EU-
15 member states is studied by means of panel data methods. The
length of EU membership is found to have a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect
on economic growth, which is relatively higher for poorer countries.
While previous empirical studies tend not to ﬁnd positive growth ef-
fects of regional integration, the present study suggests an asymmet-
ric, convergence-stimulating impact of EU membership on long-term
growth.
Keywords: convergence, economic growth, European Union,
threshold panel data regression
JEL codes: F15, F43, C23
∗Jesu´s Crespo-Cuaresma, University of Vienna, Department of Economics,
Bru¨nnerstraße 72, A-1210 Vienna, Austria; Phone: (+43-1) 4277-37477, Fax : (+43-1)
4277-37498, E-mail address: jesus.crespo-cuaresma@univie.ac.at
†Doris Ritzberger-Gru¨nwald, Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Foreign Research Divi-
sion, Otto-Wagner-Platz 3, POB 61, A-1011 Vienna, Austria, Phone: (+43-1) 40420-5200,
Fax : (+43-1) 40420-5299, E-mail address: doris.ritzberger-gruenwald@oenb.at
‡Maria Antoinette Silgoner, Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Foreign Research Division,
Otto-Wagner-Platz 3, POB 61, A-1011 Vienna, Austria, Phone: (+43-1) 40420-5231, Fax :
(+43-1) 40420-5299, E-mail address: maria.silgoner@oenb.at
1
Page 1 of 27
































































For the last 50 years there has been widespread discussion about the eco-
nomic consequences of European integration. The basic questions are: Is
economic integration growth enhancing? Are the rich getting richer and the
poor getting poorer, or will the income levels of the EC/EU member coun-
tries converge as a consequence of integration? Furthermore, which countries
will proﬁt most from intensiﬁed trade among the members? The discussion
on the growth eﬀects of EU membership has gained momentum since the last
enlargment round on May 1, 2004 when ten countries became new member
states of the European Union, expanding the EU’s population by 20%.
The theoretical literature on economic growth has gone through several
phases, and the answers to the above questions depend on the speciﬁcation
of the respective growth model.
From the late 1950s to the mid-1980s the simple Solow-Swan exogenous
growth model dominated the literature (Solow, 1956). According to the neo-
classical theory, the economy converges towards a steady state due to di-
minishing returns to investment in physical capital. Assuming a constant
population, the long-run growth rate is solely determined by the rate of
technological change, which is assumed to be exogenous. As the growth rate
is therefore independent of any economic behavior, economic policy changes
will only have a temporary eﬀect on economic activity.
The same is true for economic integration (in the sense of an increase of
the market size). Technological change is considered a public good common
to all countries, so that they all share the same long-run growth rate deter-
mined by technological progress only. Therefore the integrated economy will
expand along this unchanged steady state growth path in the long run, and
the reallocation of resources will only temporarily have an inﬂuence on the
growth rate. Hence according to the neoclassical vie of growth, European
integration should not have a lasting eﬀect on growth rates. However the
income levels should converge perfectly.
In the mid-1980s the so-called endogenous growth theory revolutionized
the literature on economic growth (Romer, 1990). Technology that was for-
merly considered a public good and exogenous now became endogenous and
subject to decision-making processes at individual ﬁrms. According to this
concept, enterprises have an incentive to invest in research, as the devel-
opment of new technologies assures them of the possession of temporary
monopoly power. But the absorption of monopoly rents is limited, as knowl-
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edge is only partially excludable. Patent protection is limited in time, and
inventions can be used as input to further research and new technological
innovations. These knowledge spillovers prevent the ﬁrms from collecting
the full monopoly rent for their new inventions.
The aspect of the new growth theory according to which technological
progress depends on the research activities of individual ﬁrms which seek to
collect monopoly rents opens a new view on the issue of economic growth
in an integrated region: now an increased scale of the economy will have a
lasting positive eﬀect on growth. On the one hand, knowledge spillovers im-
ply increasing returns to scale to capital accumulation. On the other hand,
the monopoly rent increases with the number of consumers while the costs
for research and development are independent of the size of the economy.
The prospect of higher proﬁts increases the incentive for further research
and hence spurs economic growth. These two factors together imply that
the long-run growth rate increases with the size of the economy.1
To sum up, the consequences of European integration are fundamentally
diﬀerent within the framework of endogenous growth. The more countries
join the Economic Union and hence the larger the scale of the integrated
economy is, the higher the incentive for R&D is and, accordingly, the higher
the growth rate is. Enhanced growth is now not only a transitory, but a
permanent phenomenon from which all countries proﬁt in the long run.
In this sense, testing for a growth eﬀect due to European integration could
be seen as a strategy to prove the superiority of one of these two theoretical
frameworks. There are, however, possibilities to allow for the existence of
integration-driven growth eﬀects within the neoclassical paradigm of exoge-
nous growth, just by modelling the process of technological growth in a more
complex manner (for example, by letting the growth rate of technology be a
function of the overall size of the integrated unit). Therefore, evidence for
integration related growth eﬀects could thus be seen as a motivation for a
more complex modelling of the technological progress variable.
Most empirical papers on economic growth aim at detecting the main
determinants of long-run growth without referring explicitly to regional inte-
gration or deal with convergence and divergence across European regions (see
1A countervailing eﬀect of integration which could work in the opposite direction to
the one described in the text refers to the fact that, in a larger market, competition is
more intense and monopoly rents are smaller and more short-lived. However, empirical
research on the eﬀect of trade integration on growth suggests a dominant role of the growth
enhancing eﬀect. See below for some references.
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for example Button and Pentecost, 1995, Sala-i-Martin, 1996, Quah, 1996 or
Magrini, 1996). The ﬁrst papers dealing with the question of a possible
growth bonus associated with European integration were all cross-country
studies. Basically, they compare EU members with other countries that have
not joined the European Union, mostly countries at a similar stage of devel-
opment. The basic question is whether there exists a global growth beneﬁt
from being a EU member. Most of the studies do not ﬁnd any such growth
bonus (see e.g. De Melo et al., 1992 or Landau, 1995).
However, panel data regression techniques opened up a new way to deal
with the question of possible growth beneﬁts associated with EU member-
ship. Focusing exclusively on the current EU member states the basic ques-
tion then can be whether in retrospect they proﬁted from regional integration.
The line of research we will follow is based on the estimation of growth
regressions using panel data methods. The superiority of panel data meth-
ods over cross-country growth regressions has been highlighted often in the
empirical literature (see e.g. Islam, 1995). The main advantage of pooled
estimation is the explicit modelling of country-speciﬁc eﬀects, removing thus
part of the problem caused by the unobservability of initial levels of technical
eﬃciency.
There are two studies which ask questions similar to the ones discussed
in our paper, although they look at a wider set of countries and do not ex-
clusively focus on EU members.
Vanhoudt (1999) tests the validity of the neoclassical implication that re-
gional integration has no impact on long-term growth against the alternative
model based on endogenous growth theory. He carries out panel data regres-
sions on 23 OECD countries to check whether EU membership had a positive
impact on growth compared to developed countries which have not joined the
European Union. He does not ﬁnd evidence of a signiﬁcant long-run growth
bonus associated either with EU membership or with membership length.
Also, the results do not support the hypothesis of a scale eﬀect on growth.
The author concludes that the neoclassical hypothesis cannot be rejected by
the data.
Henrekson et al. (1997), who focus on EC as well as on EFTA mem-
ber countries, ﬁnd the opposite result: EC/EFTA membership may increase
growth rates signiﬁcantly, by around 0.6 to 0.8 percentage point per year.
However, apparently it does not matter whether a country is an EC or an
EFTA member. Their results support the hypothesis that regional integra-
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tion in Europe can have signiﬁcant growth eﬀects and suggest that further
regional integration may be growth enhancing in the long run. However, the
results of the paper are not completely robust with respect to changes in the
model speciﬁcation.
Both these studies and the present paper deal with the question of whether
European integration had a positive impact on long-term growth in the mem-
ber countries. Our study, however, deviates from the other two in that it
exclusively focuses on EU member states2 and in that it deals with the issue
of convergence within the integrated European economy. Focussing on the
15 EU member states as of January 2004 our questions are: Have per capita
income levels in European countries converged towards each other since the
1960s? And if EU membership had a favorable impact on growth in these
countries, can we detect subsets of countries that proﬁted more than aver-
age from EU membership? Can we conclude from these asymmetric gains
in growth that convergence was also a consequence of intensiﬁed economic
involvement due to European integration?
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a short overview of the
diﬀerent concepts of convergence and presents some ﬁrst results. In section
3 we introduce the speciﬁc econometric form of our growth model and its
extensions and report the empirical results. Section 4 concludes and makes
propositions for further research. Details about the data and the econometric
speciﬁcation can be found in the appendix.
2 Convergence and growth in the EU - con-
cepts and first results
The term β-convergence was coined by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and
refers to the negative correlation between initial levels of real GDP per capita
and its average yearly growth rate either after conditioning for certain control
variables (conditional β-convergence) or without conditioning (unconditional
β-convergence). For a complete survey on the empirical literature dealing
with evidence on β-convergence, see e.g. Durlauf and Quah (1998).3 To-
2Another recent contribution to this branch of literature, Badinger (2001), focuses
exclusively on European countries using a somehow diﬀerent approach and ﬁnding again
no evidence for a growth bonus of EU membership.
3Notice that this approach is not free from criticism. For a critical view and alternative
concepts of convergence based on the time series properties of real GDP per capita, see
e.g. Bernard and Durlauf (1995,1996) or Bernard and Jones (1996).
5
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gether with the concept of β-convergence, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992)
introduce the complementary concept of σ-convergence, which refers to the
decrease of the dispersion of real GDP per capita across economic units
through time. It should be noted that β-convergence is a necessary but not
suﬃcient condition for σ-convergence.
Figure 1 shows a scatter plot aimed at checking for (unconditional) β-
convergence in the European Union for the period 1960–98: on the x axis,
the initial (log) level of real GDP per capita in 1960 is represented, while the
y axis shows the average yearly growth of real GDP per capita in the period
1960–98. A visual inspection points at a negative relationship between both
variables.
This ﬁrst indication of convergence is conﬁrmed by dividing the data for
the EU-15 countries into four subperiods (1961–70, 1971–80, 1981–90, 1991–
98)4 and estimating the β parameter in the error-components model
[ln(yTt,i)− ln(y0t,i)]/nt = α + βln(y0t,i) + ut,i, (1)
where yTt,i refers to the real GDP per capita in the last year of period t
(t = 1, 2, 3, 4 stands for each of the subperiods described above) for country i,
y0t,i refers to the value of real GDP per capita in the initial year of period t and
nt is the number of years in period t. Equation (1) has been estimated based
on diﬀerent assumptions for the error term, and the results are presented in
Table 1, together with the test statistic for equality of β parameters across
subperiods.5 The ﬁrst column shows the result for the assumption that the
error term is independent of the cross-sectional units (countries) and iid
normal (that is, the panel is estimated as if it were a cross-country regression).
The second column shows the results for the assumption of ﬁxed country
eﬀects, that is,
ut,i = µi + t,i,
where µi is a country-speciﬁc constant and t is white noise. Finally, the
third column shows the estimated β under the assumption of ﬁxed country
4A minimum amount of eight years seems reasonable for studying long-term growth
features, because thus business cycle ﬂuctuations are eliminated. In the literature the
estimates for the average business cycle length in European countries deviate substantially
across countries and depending on the detrending method. In general, however they do
not tend to exceed 8 years but remain within a range of around 3 to 5 years. For recent
estimations on the euro area as well as on selected European countries see e.g. Harding
and Pagan (2001) or Artis et al. (2003).
5Throughout the study (with the exception of the exercise on σ-convergence across
European countries) Luxembourg was excluded from the estimations for two reasons: It
is typically considered an outlier, and no data on average education years is available for
this country in Barro and Lee (2001).
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and time eﬀects, that is,
ut,i = µi + λt + t,i,
where µi and t are deﬁned as above, and λt is an exclusively time-dependent
constant eﬀect. All speciﬁcations reported in Table 1 point at the existence
of very signiﬁcant unconditional β-convergence across EU members for the
period 1960-98, and the null of equality of convergence parameters across
subperiods cannot be rejected as long as country ﬁxed eﬀects are included in
the regression.6
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the cross-country coeﬃcient of variation
of per capita GDP for the period 1960–98 for the 15 EU countries in our
analysis, as well as for subsets of countries grouped by cronology of EU en-
try: EU-6 (Germany, France, Italy, Belgium Netherlands and Luxembourg),
EU-10 (EU-6 plus United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark and Greece) and EU-
12 (EU-10 plus Spain and Portugal). By visual inspection the trend is clearly
decreasing for the full sample and the subgroups EU-10 and EU-12, indicating
σ-convergence. Whether the standard deviation in the ﬁnal period is signif-
icantly diﬀerent from that of the ﬁrst period can be tested using the T2 test
statistic developed by Carree and Klomp (1997),7 which is χ2(1) distributed
under the null hypothesis of no σ-convergence. The value of T2 for the EU-15
data is 4.46, which indicates rejection of the null of no σ-convergence at a
5% signiﬁcance level. The value for EU-12 is 3.80, also signiﬁcant at a 10%
level. Two clear regimes can be identiﬁed in the dynamics of the dispersion
of GDP per capita for the EU-6 (formed by countries which tend to be above
EU-15 average in terms of GDP per capita) and, to a lesser extent, in the
EU-10 group. The dispersion of income across EU-6 countries had a negative
trend until the beginning of the 1980s, which reversed in the late 1980s and
1990s. The diﬀerence between the dispersion in 1960 and in 1998 has been
positive, although it is not signiﬁcant at any reasonable signiﬁcance level,
with a T2 test statistic of 0.05. The results for EU-10 are an intermediate
case, with a decrease in dispersion of income between 1960 and 1998 which
6Notice that while the common intercept speciﬁcation hypothesizes convergence to a
common steady state, the use of country ﬁxed eﬀects assumes potentially diﬀerent steady
states. This issue will be dealt with in more depth below.
7The T2 test statistic is deﬁned as






T − σˆ20T )
]
,
where N refers to the number of countries, σˆ20 and σˆ
2
T are the cross-country variances of
real GDP per capita in the initial period and the ﬁnal period, respectively, and σˆ0T is the
covariance between initial and ﬁnal real GDP per capita.
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appears insigniﬁcant using the T2 test, with a test statistic of 1.93.
8
3 Growth and EU membership
3.1 The basic model and some extensions
In order to study explicitly the determinants of long-term growth in Europe
in the last four decades, equation (1) will be extended by including an aug-
mented set of explanatory variables. The obvious candidates to form part of
the group are those variables which are explicitly implied by economic the-
ory and which have been used in virtually every empirical study on economic
growth: the initial (log) level of per capita GDP – evaluated in our case at
the ﬁrst year of each subperiod –, the investment share – subperiod average –
and some proxy for human capital – average years of education of population
over 25, evaluated at the ﬁrst year of the subperiod.
Together with these basic variables others which are considered to be rele-
vant to economic growth have been included in the econometric speciﬁcation.
The speciﬁcation in which all the estimated models presented in Table 2 are
nested is:
[ln(yTt,i)− ln(y0t,i)]/nt = β1ln(y0t,i) + β2ln(INVt,i) + β3EDt,i + β4INFt,i +
+β5GOVt,i + β6OPt,i + β7Y EAt,i + ut,i, (2)
where ln(y0t,i) is the (log) initial GDP per capita of country i in subperiod
t, ln(INVt,i) is the (log) investment share, EDt,i refers to the years of edu-
cation, INFt,i is the subperiod-average inﬂation rate, GOVt,i is government
consumption over GDP, OPt,i is openness of the economy deﬁned as trade
over GDP,9 and Y EAt,i is the average length of EU membership (in years)
8Notice that the remarkable change in trend experienced since the end of the seventies
could represent a structural break in the process underlying the dynamics of σ-convergence.
We test this hypothesis by implementing the test procedure proposed by Hansen (1997)
on the ﬁrst diﬀerences of the variation coeﬃcient for EU-15, which were assumed to be
represented by an AR(1) process. The results give evidence for a break in the parameters
of the data generating process around 1978, notwithstanding the fact that the results of
the test should be interpreted with care, as the data is actually generated out of the cross-
section variability of the sample. This would give room for further investigation, that goes
beyond the scope of this paper.
9Due to the multidimensional nature of the concept of trade, there are many diﬀer-
ent measures for openness, most of which are found to be almost uncorrelated (see e.g.
Pritchett, 1996). The openness index developed in Sachs and Warner (1995), which has
been widely used in the empirical literature on economic growth, would be of little use in
this study, as the variable they propose is a dummy that would take a value of one for
practically the whole sample used here.
8
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for country i in subperiod t.10 The error term ut,i is assumed to be composed
by a constant country-speciﬁc eﬀect and a common constant time eﬀect, al-
though in the estimation the latter will only be included if found signiﬁcant.
The speciﬁcation given by (2) can be seen as a log-linearization in a
neighborhood of the steady state of the Solow model augmented with hu-
man capital a` la Hall and Jones (1999), as derived in Mankiw et al. (1992).
They suggest the use of the logarithm in the investment share and the level
of school enrollment (the human capital function put forward by Hall and
Jones, 1999, is exponential on the education variable) as additional variables
to initial GDP. The rest of the controls could thus be seen as explaining the
growth rate of technological progress (assumed constant in the basic Solow
speciﬁcation).11
Table 2 shows the results of the estimation of the diﬀerent speciﬁcations
of our growth model.
In a ﬁrst step, growth is regressed on initial GDP, the investment share
and the years of education. All coeﬃcients in the ﬁrst column have the
expected signs. Growth depends negatively on initial GDP, indicating β-
convergence. The investment share enters positively (see e.g. Barro, 1991,
Levine and Renelt, 1992), although not signiﬁcant at the 10% signiﬁcance
level. Turning to education, most authors ﬁnd that the overall level of edu-
cation is growth enhancing (see e.g. Barro, 1991).12 Our positive and signiﬁ-
cant coeﬃcient for the average years of education seems to support this result.
In a second step, the inﬂation rate, government consumption over GDP
and openness of the economy are added to the model as explanatory vari-
ables. The inclusion of these three variables does not change the signs of
the ﬁrst three factors, as can be seen in the second column. Inﬂation enters
10For Germany we use data for West Germany until 1991, and for the uniﬁed Germany
from 1991 onwards. Initially, an additional dummy variable was included in order to
account for the German uniﬁcation, but it appeared insigniﬁcant in all speciﬁcations. For
further details on the data, see the appendix.
11Empirical studies dealing with a more heterogeneous set of countries tend to include
population growth on the right hand side of the growth equation, as implied by the original
Solow model (see e.g. Mankiw et al., 1992). In our case, the variable appeared insigniﬁ-
cant in every speciﬁcation in which it was included and was therefore not added to ﬁnal
speciﬁcation. The same occurred when a socio-demographic variable like female partici-
pation in the labor market was used. A possible explanation of the lack of signiﬁcance of
labor participation would be the high correlation between this variable and initial GDP.
12There is, however, some indication that primary education has a negative impact on
growth, see e.g. Barro (1997).
9
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the equation with a negative sign, indicating the growth-hampering eﬀect of
high increases in the price level (for a detailed study on this relationship, see
Barro, 1995). The minus sign of the coeﬃcient for the government consump-
tion ratio implies a negative relationship between government expenditures
and growth. Other empirical studies, e.g. Barro (1991) and Barro (1997)
also found this result. The intuition is that government spending has only a
temporary inﬂuence on growth, while in the long run the growth-hampering
impact of high debt levels as a consequence of excessive government spending
as well as possible allocative ineﬃciencies predominate. In our case, however,
the coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant (a result also found by Levine and Renelt,
1992). Finally the coeﬃcient for the openness of the economy is signiﬁcant
and shows the expected positive sign, supporting the view that trade stimu-
lates growth. This result is also found by Harrison (1995), Sachs and Warner
(1995).
In the ﬁnal step, the model is modiﬁed by inclusion of the subperiod-
average number of years since a country’s accession to the European Union.
The choice of this speciﬁcation of the membership variable aims at reﬂecting
the potentially time-varying nature of the growth eﬀect of integration and
it ﬁts to the long-term orientation of EU membership. It is also aimed at
modelling the fact that those countries that have been EU members for a
longer time will have adapted their institutional setting in order to be grasp
more beneﬁts of the enlarged economic area. Notice that, having controlled
already for openness and initial GDP per capita, the EU membership variable
will reﬂect growth eﬀects of regional integration diﬀerent from those directly
related to trade and pure convergence a` la Solow.13 The positive and signif-
icant coeﬃcient in column 3 indicates that the longer a country has been a
member of the EU, the more it proﬁts from membership. The inclusion of
this new variable leaves the signs of the other coeﬃcients unchanged. The
coeﬃcient for education is still positive, but it is now signiﬁcant at the 5%
level. This extended model explains approximately 78% of the variation in
growth.
If the results are to be interpreted under the light of the parametrization
in Mankiw et al. (1992), the point estimate of the implied factor share of
physical capital (assuming a Cobb-Douglas function with labour augmenting
13The fact that our openness variable is deﬁned as trade over GDP implies that trade-
related technology absorption is already partly captured by the positive coeﬃcient for
OPt,i. This is expected to actually reduce the size of our coeﬃcient for the impact of
the EU membership variable and reinforces the importance of technological spillovers as
a driving force for growth.
10
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human capital as in Hall and Jones, 1999) from the model speciﬁcation with
the Y EA variable is approximately 0.46. The implied return to human capi-
tal formation is 0.035. Both values are in line with those reported in Mankiw
et al. (1992) and Hall and Jones (1999).
In order to ensure the validity of our results several robustness checks
were carried out. First, the model is also estimated without government
consumption, as the coeﬃcient proved insigniﬁcant in models 2 and 3. The
other coeﬃcients remain practically unchanged, some of them becoming even
more signiﬁcant. This strengthens the robustness of our previous results.
Another source of concern in terms of adequacy of the estimation method
could be the potential endogeneity of right-hand side regressors. The usual
suspects would be the investment share, education attainment and openness,
which have sometimes been claimed to depend upon the growth rate of GDP
per capita. In order to account for this possibility, the speciﬁcation in (2) was
reestimated using instrumental variables. The results of the Sargan test for
validity of instruments supports the use of population growth, government
consumption and the initial sub-period levels of investment and openness as
instruments for the investment share (the Sargan test statistic takes a value
of 0.95, and therefore cannot reject that these are valid instruments at any
reasonable signiﬁcance level). The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test cannot reject
the null hypothesis of no endogeneity for the regressors considered, validat-
ing thereby the use of OLS as an estimation method (the ﬁtted values of the
investment share from the ﬁrst stage appear highly insigniﬁcant when added
to the ﬁnal speciﬁcation, with a t-statistic of -0.21) .
The eﬀect represented by the coeﬃcient of the variable Y EAt,i aﬀects
only countries that have been members of the EU for at least one year in
a given subperiod. It could be the case, however, that a larger regionally
integrated space has an eﬀect also on the growth rates of countries that do
not form part of it yet. In order to check for this possibility and to shed a
light on whether membership is actually required for gaining growth beneﬁts
from regional integration, the model was reestimated by replacing Y EAt,i
with a scale variable common to all countries but variable in time, which
captures the size of the regionally integrated unit. We used three diﬀerent
speciﬁcations of the scale variable (aggregate population, aggregate GDP
and aggregate labor force), and the coeﬃcient always appeared positive, but
insigniﬁcant. Therefore, the growth beneﬁts associated with regional inte-
gration seem to be due to formal participation in the union.
Another objection to our conclusion could be that it is not EU member-
11
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ship itself that enhances growth, but that the accompanying stability mea-
sures for nominal macroeconomic variables had a positive impact on growth
performance. Partly this was already accounted for by including the inﬂa-
tion rate as an explanatory variable. To check in addition for the impact of
a potential decrease in the exchange rate volatility caused by EU member-
ship, the standard deviation of the exchange rate against the US dollar for
each country was included as an additional independent variable. However,
its coeﬃcient appeared insigniﬁcant in all speciﬁcations. This indicates that
exchange rate policy does not explain the existence of a growth bonus asso-
ciated with EU membership.
We tried several other speciﬁcations in order to capture potential de-
creasing returns to EU membership, however models with the log or square
root of Y EAt,i did not improve upon the model with a linear Y EAt,i vari-
able. Including a squared term of Y EAt,i improves the estimation in terms
of adjusted R2 and renders a (10%) signiﬁcant negative parameter for the
quadratic term. This model is presented in column 5. Notice that the size of
the parameter estimates imply that the quantitative eﬀect is relatively small
and tends to matter only for countries after very long periods of membership.
To sum up, our model so far explains a considerable part of the variation
in growth, and the results strongly support the hypothesis of (conditional)
β-convergence: poorer countries have caught up with the richer ones since
the 1960s, and the rate of convergence is found to be approximately 4% and
6%, depending on the speciﬁcation used.14 This rate of convergence appears
signiﬁcantly higher than convergence rates reported in cross-country studies
due to the use of ﬁxed country eﬀects, and should thus be interpreted as the
common convergence rate to country-speciﬁc steady states. Furthermore,
the coeﬃcient estimates support the hypothesis of a positive impact of in-
vestment, education and openness on growth, as well as a negative impact of
high inﬂation rates. Finally the results not only point at a growth-enhancing
eﬀect of EU membership, but they also show that this eﬀect gained impor-
tance over the duration of membership, with some evidence of decreasing
returns to EU membership.
14The rate of convergence, λ, has been computed using nonlinear least squares on each
speciﬁcation, replacing the coeﬃcient corresponding to initial GDP per capita by the term
−[1−exp(−λT )]/T , where T is the subperiod length. This expression for λ results from the
log linearization around the steady state in the Solow model as in Mankiw et al. (1992).
The smallest estimate of λ is obtained in the simplest model (including only investment
and education variables) and equals 0.04, with a standard error of 0.007. The estimate for
the model including the Y EAt,i variable equals 0.06, with standard error 0.015.
12
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3.2 Who profits most from EU membership?
One interesting extension to the basic models is to look in more detail at
the ﬁnding that EU membership is growth enhancing and furthermore be-
comes even more so the longer a country belongs to the confederation. A
particularly interesting question is whether a subgroup of countries proﬁted
more from EU membership than other countries. The idea is to divide the
sample of countries into subsets with respect to one of the other variables
and to investigate whether the coeﬃcient for the years of membership diﬀers
signiﬁcantly across subgroups. The evidence of decreasing growth returns to
EU membership reported above could actually be masking diﬀerent eﬀects
across countries, and could arise from the variation in timing of EU entry.
One basic way to do that would be to split the sample according to a
priori deﬁned rules. For example one could deﬁne poor, medium and rich
countries by setting the borderline income levels. The threshold panel data
technique, however, oﬀers a more neutral approach. It allows to test whether
such subgroups can be found at all and how many subsets are appropriate.
Furthermore, it estimates explicitly the borderline income levels. The main
advantage of this approach is that it avoids ad hoc deﬁnitions of subgroups,
but tests the hypothesis of the existence of subsets against the alternative of
no division of the sample.
In our extension of the basic model we test whether countries with a lower
initial per capita income level proﬁted more or less from EU membership than
more developed countries. If subsamples according to initial income levels
can be identiﬁed and the coeﬃcient for the years of EU membership is sig-
niﬁcantly higher for initially poorer countries, this would be an indication of
increased economic convergence as a consequence of European integration.
If, however, we get the opposite result, this would indicate that the initially
richer countries are also the ones which proﬁt most from intensiﬁed economic
involvement.
Table 3 gives the results of the threshold estimation, and Table 4 presents
the parameter estimates of the threshold model, where the nonlinear eﬀect
has been built upon the Y EAt,i variable. For the details concerning the
threshold panel data technique, see the appendix. The estimation procedure
identiﬁes exactly one threshold at a level of (log) initial GDP per capita
equal to 9.8 (approximately, USD 18,000). A 95% conﬁdence interval around
the threshold estimate computed using the empirical likelihood function is
[9.79, 9.93]. The test for linearity rejects the null of no threshold eﬀect at a
5% signiﬁcance level, and the null of one threshold cannot be rejected when
13
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tested against the alternative of two thresholds.
Looking at the original data set, we see that at the beginning of our
sample, that is in 1960, all countries had an initial income level below the
threshold. In 1970 Denmark and Sweden had broken through the threshold.
Ten years later, six more countries had followed and only the incomes of
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom remained
below the threshold. In 1990, ﬁnally, the income levels in Italy and the UK
exceeded the threshold income level, so that the subgroup of less developed
countries was now limited to the classical catching-up countries Greece, Ire-
land, Portugal and Spain. Towards the very end of our data set, the income
level of Ireland, which recently experienced two-digit growth rates, exceeded
the threshold level.
The next step is to divide the sample in each period according to this
threshold and rerun the panel regressions. The results are shown in Table 4,
where we now have a separate coeﬃcient for the length of EU membership
for each subgroup. The coeﬃcient for the years of EU membership is positive
and signiﬁcant for both subgroups. Furthermore we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient
diﬀers signiﬁcantly across groups and is signiﬁcantly higher for the countries
with lower initial income levels. All the other coeﬃcients show the expected
signs. The new model, which splits the countries into two subgroups accord-
ing to their initial income levels, explains around 83% of the variation in
growth.15
A similar type of eﬀect of initial GDP per capita levels on the parameter
attached to the EU membership variable could have been attained by in-
cluding an interaction term between initial GDP per capita and the Y EAt,i
variable in the speciﬁcation given by (2). If the speciﬁcation with an in-
teraction term is estimated, the coeﬃcient of the product of Y EAt,i with
the initial GDP per capita variable appears signiﬁcant and negative (the es-
timate equals -0.07, with a robust standard error of 0.03), indicating that
countries with a lower level of development (in terms of GDP per capita)
beneﬁtted from higher growth rates due to EU membership. It should be
pointed out that the model with an interaction term assumes that the coef-
ﬁcient of Y EAt,i decreases linearly with the level of initial GDP per capita
of the country, while the threshold model assumes the existence of two co-
eﬃcients for Y EAt,i, depending on the level of development of the country.
15To check for robustness the model was reestimated using Switzerland as an external
control country. The coeﬃcients remained similar in terms of sign, range and signiﬁcance.
The goodness of ﬁt, furthermore, improved considerably. The results are not reported in
the tables and are available upon request from the authors.
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Although qualitatively the conclusions of both models are similar, the good-
ness of ﬁt (as measured by the adjusted R2) of the model with a threshold
eﬀect is relatively better than that of the model with an interaction (77%
against 83% of the variation of growth rates are explained by, respectively,
the model with an interaction term and the model with a threshold eﬀect).
We also checked the residuals of the ﬁnal model for normality using the
Jarque-Bera (JB) test. The JB test statistic, χ2 distributed with two de-
grees of freedom under the null hypothesis of Gaussian distribution of the
residuals, takes a value of 15.69, and therefore rejects the null hypothesis of
normally distributed residuals at any reasonable signiﬁcance level. The lack
of normality seems to be caused by a single observation, corresponding to
Ireland during the last subperiod of the sample, for which our model strongly
underestimates the growth rate of GDP per capita. Including a dummy for
this single observation does not change our results qualitatively, and improves
enormously the ﬁt of the model. The JB test cannot reject now normality
at any sensible signiﬁcance level. The estimates of this model are presented
in column 4B in Table 4. The estimate of the parameter on Y EAt,i for the
lower regime of countries is obviously smaller than before, as we have dum-
mied out an observation of extreme positive growth performance belonging
to that regime, but remains signiﬁcantly higher than the coeﬃcient for the
higher regime.
Hence while we ﬁnd that, ceteris paribus, countries with a higher level
of development grew faster the longer they were member of the EU, this
eﬀect is even more pronounced when it comes to the subgroup of less ad-
vanced countries.16 This ﬁnding can be interpreted as another indication for
a catching-up process of poorer towards richer countries in Europe in the
sense that with two countries entering the EU at the same point in time
the growth bonus is larger for the less advanced country.17 Not only do our
results show that countries with lower initial incomes grew faster than the
more advanced countries (β-convergence),18 the estimates also imply that
16The exercise was repeated using the relative level of GDP per capita with respect
to the average of current member states as a threshold variable. However, the test for
linearity could not reject the null of linearity at any reasonable signiﬁcance level. This
suggests that it is the absolute level of development of the country that determines the
asymmetric eﬀect of EU membership on long term growth.
17This, however, does not imply that this growth bonus alone has actually led to absolute
convergence of the EU member states. The diﬀerent entry dates and the cumulative nature
of the growth bonus has lead to several more advanced economies proﬁting relatively more
from integration.
18An F-test for equality of β-convergence parameters across time results in an insignif-
icant test statistic of 0.55, backing up the results presented for the case of unconditional
15
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countries that exhibit per capita income levels below the threshold proﬁt
more from long-term EU membership than richer countries.
A theoretically sound interpretation of the results would be that it is the
relatively less developed countries that proﬁt most from access to the broader
technological framework oﬀered by the regionally integrated unit. The vari-
able referring to the duration of EU membership would then be interpreted as
one of the variables explaining technological progress in a theoretical frame-
work such as in Mankiw et al. (1992).
4 Conclusions and prospects for further re-
search
The empirical study performed in this paper shows that EU membership
has had a positive and asymmetric eﬀect on long-term economic growth. As
the model speciﬁcation uses openness as a control variable, the growth eﬀect
picked up by the regional integration variable diﬀers from that resulting from
intensiﬁed trade and would relate to the improvements in the transmission
of technological knowledge among the EU member states. The results would
imply that it is the relatively less developed countries that proﬁt most from
access to the broader technological framework oﬀered by the regionally in-
tegrated unit. Given that the estimates of the eﬀect of EU membership are
retrieved after conditioning upon the initial levels of GDP per capita, this
eﬀect acts on top of the usual convergence dynamics implied by neoclassical
growth models.
It could be argued that technology diﬀusion is not the only factor explain-
ing the growth bonus associated with EU membership. One argument that
may as well be used to interpret the results relies upon the assumption that
ﬁnancial help from the EU to relatively poorer members actually does have
an eﬀect on long-term growth. In fact the EU budget generated major net
ﬁnancial transfers to the four cohesion countries – Greece, Portugal, Ireland
and Spain.19 In 2000, these net transfers accounted for 3.6% of Greek GNP,
1.9% of Portuguese GNP, 1.8% of Irish GNP and 0.9% of Spanish GNP. To a
lesser extent, Finland, Denmark and Italy also showed positive net balances
(see European Commission 2001). The European Commission runs several
β-convergence, and conﬁrming the stability of the convergence parameters across time.
19The cohesion fund was established in 1993, after the Mediterranean countries Greece
(1981) and Spain and Portugal (1986) had joined the European Union. Cohesion countries
are EU member countries whose GDP per capita is lower than 90% of the EU average.
16
Page 16 of 27































































macroeconomic models (for an overview see the 6th Periodic Report of the
European Commission 1999) in order to assess the eﬀectivity of these trans-
fers. The Beutel model, for instance, is used to investigate how much of
the economic growth in the member states covered can be attributed to EU
co-funded programs and EU grants. According to the model, EU transfers
during the two programming periods (1989 to 1993 and 1994 to 1999) are
found to have increased GDP growth in the four cohesion countries by an
average of 0.5 percentage points in the ﬁrst period and 0.7 percentage points
in the second period. The overall result of a number of macroeconomic mod-
els is that one third of the reduction in disparities in GDP per capita is due
to the Structural Funds (Moucque 2000).
In order to assess this question directly, we also collected comparable data
from the European Commission on ﬁnancial assistance in form of structural
funds for the countries in our sample (as a percentage of GDP) for the period
1992-2000, roughly corresponding to the last subperiod in our sample. The
cross-country correlation between the average structural fund receipts (as
percentage of GDP) and the growth bonus for this subperiod computed for
the model with a threshold eﬀect, although positive, is only approximately
0.23 (and therefore insigniﬁcant using Fisher’s z-transform). The member-
ship bonus we are capturing includes thus other factors which dominate the
pure eﬀect of structural funds, and that may as well be related to insti-
tutional quality and its evolution through time. In a recent contribution,
Ederveen et al. (2002) oﬀer solid empirical evidence concerning the impor-
tance of institutional quality in order to grasp the beneﬁts of structural funds.
A diﬀerent potential explanation for the growth bonus could be related
to ﬁscal policy. Fo¨lster and Henrekson (2001) ﬁnd a robust and negative
relationship between government size and economic growth. This could pro-
vide another possible explanation for our result that EU membership had
a positive impact on growth, as due to liberalization measures inherent to
the integration process the size of the government in EU member states has
decreased rapidly in the last decade (an EU-average decrease of around 6%
in government expenditure over GDP between 1991 and 2000, according to
the OECD’s Main Economic Indicators Database).20 Possible other sources
of the growth bonus could be the stabilization of expectations in the context
of the European Exchange Rate Mechanism or the change in the institu-
tional framework due to European integration (the results in Tsionas and
Christopoulos, 2003, point in this direction).
20The only countries that experienced an increase in this measure of government size are
the ones that received substantial resources from EU structural funds. The co-ﬁnancing
requirement by itself would lead to an increase in government expenditure.
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One interesting question would be whether our results allow implications
for the last enlargement round on May 1st, 2004. In terms of pure GDP per
capita levels, some of the new EU member countries (Slovenia, the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) have already reached a GDP per capita
level (in % of the EU-15) which is similar to or even above the one Greece
showed at its EU entry in 1981. As our study is based on historical data for
the EU-15 member states, it would be adventurous to directly apply the ﬁnd-
ings to the new members and potential future entrants. The structural and
institutional diﬀerences in these economies as compared to the current mem-
ber states are sometimes very signiﬁcant, and even the fact that the income
levels of all candidate countries currently lie below our estimated threshold
does not allow for the straightforward conclusion that these countries will
indeed proﬁt more than average from EU membership. Additionally, one
should take into consideration that the transformation process that these
countries had to undergo during the last decade makes their growth experi-
ence hardly comparable with that of the countries in our sample and limits
the applicability of our results.
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- Real GDP per capita in 1995 USD - computed using the Atlas con-
version factor -: World Development Indicators 2001 - World Bank -
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except the data for West Germany (1960-91), which were built from
the International Financial Statistics - International Monetary Fund -
and own calculations.
- Investment Share: World Development Indicators 2001 - World Bank
- except the data for West Germany (1960-91), which were built from
the Penn World Table 5.5.
- Average schooling years of population over 25: taken from Barro and
Lee (2001).
- Inﬂation rate: GDP deﬂator, taken from World Development Indica-
tors 2001 - World Bank - except the data for West Germany (1960-91),
which were built from the World Tables Database - World Bank.
- Government consumption (% of GDP): World Development Indica-
tors 2001 - World Bank - except the data for West Germany (1960-91),
which were taken from the OECD Macroeconomic Country-Level Data-
bank.
- Openness: trade in % of GDP, taken from the World Development
Indicators 2001 - World Bank - except the data for West Germany
(1960-91), which were taken from the Penn World Table 5.5.
Threshold panel data models: estimation and testing
Inference in threshold panel data models has been recently developed by
Hansen (1999). Let yt,i be the dependent variable for cross-section i at time t,
which depends on a set of explanatory variables {xjt,i, j = 1, . . . , k} according






















for i = 1, . . . , N and t = 1, . . . , T ; where ut,i is white noise with variance σ
2.
The model is, thus, a piecewise-linear one, where the α parameters depend
on whether the value of xrt,i - the threshold variable - exceeds γ or not. The
threshold value, γ, is treated as a parameter to be estimated. Notice that, for
a given value of γ, equation (3) can be easily estimated by dividing the sam-
ple into the observations corresponding to xrt,i ≤ γ and those in the regime
xrt,i > γ. The parameters can then be estimated using the Within method
(see e.g. Baltagi, 1995).
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Estimating γ implies choosing the estimator γˆ which together with its
corresponding α parameters, {αˆ1j (γˆ), αˆ2j(γˆ), j = 1, . . . , k}, minimize the sum
of squared residuals of model (3). The parameter γ only needs to be sought
among the actually realized values of xrt,i after trimming the initial and ﬁ-
nal tail of the distribution for identiﬁcation reasons, as for a given ordered
sample of the realizations of xr for all countries {xr1, xr2, . . . , xrN×T} and a
threshold γ˜ ∈ [xrf , xrf+1) for some f ∈ {1, . . . , N × T}, then {αˆ1j (γ˜), αˆ2j (γ˜)} =
{αˆ1j (γ∗), αˆ2j(γ∗)} for all j and for every γ∗ ∈ [xrf , xrf+1).
A most important issue in threshold models is that of testing for α1j =
α2j ∀j. The likelihood ratio test would take the usual form
F (γˆ) = [S0 − S1(γˆ)]/σˆ2,
where S0 refers to the sum of squared residuals under the null of no threshold
eﬀect and S1(γˆ) is the sum of squared residuals of the model with threshold
γˆ. However, F1 does not have a standard asymptotic distribution, as the
parameter γ is not identiﬁed under the null of linearity.21 However, the
distribution of F (γˆ) under the null can be replicated by bootstrapping, as
proposed by Hansen (1999) based on Hansen (1996): Using the empirical
distribution of the residuals by cross-section, a sample of T values is drawn
for each one of the N cross-sections and, given those values of the error term
and the observations on the xjt,i variables, the bootstrap values of yt,i are
recovered. With the bootstrap sample, the linear and the threshold model
for γˆ are estimated and the test statistic F1(γˆ) is computed as indicated
above. This procedure is repeated H times, the values {Fh, h = 1, . . . , H}
are obtained and the p-value of F (γˆ) is taken to be the number of times
that Fh(γˆ) exceeds F (γˆ), divided through H . Hansen (1996) proves that the
procedure renders asymptotically valid p-values.
21The testing problem when there is a nuisance parameter which is only identiﬁed under
the alternative has been studied by e.g. Andrews and Ploberger (1994) and Hansen (1996).
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Figure 1: GDP per capita in 1960 versus growth: EU-15 countries 1960-1998
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Common intercept Fixed eﬀects (one-way) Fixed eﬀects (two-way)
β -1.91∗∗∗ (0.20) -3.02∗∗∗ (0.37) -4.88∗∗∗ (1.41)
Obs. 56 56 56
R2adj 51.3% 62.3% 62.4%
F-test 7.12∗∗∗ 1.42 0.80
∗∗∗(∗∗)[∗] stands for 1% (5%) [10%] signiﬁcant.
Table 1: Unconditional β-convergence in the EU-15
MODEL 1 2 3 4 5
Initial GDP -3.39∗∗∗(0.45) -3.84∗∗∗ (0.52) -4.74∗∗∗(0.75) -4.82∗∗∗(0.78) -4.83∗∗∗(0.92)
Investment share 0.45 (1.09) 3.16∗∗∗ (0.90) 4.03∗∗∗(0.96) 4.11∗∗∗(0.88) 4.23∗∗∗(1.05)
Years of education 0.24∗∗ (0.10) 0.24 (0.16) 0.36∗∗(0.16) 0.36∗∗(0.17) 0.33∗(0.19)
Inﬂation rate -0.13∗∗∗(0.02) -0.12 ∗∗∗(0.02) -0.12∗∗∗(0.03) -0.12∗∗∗(0.03)
Government cons. -0.06 (0.09) -0.01 (0.10) − −
Openness 0.06∗∗(0.03) 0.07∗∗(0.03) 0.07∗∗(0.03) 0.06∗(0.03)
Years in the EU 0.03∗(0.02) 0.04∗∗(0.01) 0.11∗∗(0.04)
(Years in the EU)2 -0.002∗(0.001)
Observations 56 56 56 56 56
R2adj (in %) 61.1% 76.2% 76.9% 77.5% 79.2%
EU-15 countries included (except Luxembourg, data for West Germany until 1991, uniﬁed
Germany afterwards), with data ranging from 1961 to 1998, divided into four periods:
1961–70, 1971–80, 1981–90 and 1991–98. All data in percentage points except initial
GDP, years of education and years in the EU. White heteroskedasticity/serial correlation-
corrected standard errors in parentheses. Fixed eﬀects estimation with period-speciﬁc time
dummies included if jointly signiﬁcant. ∗∗∗(∗∗)[∗] stands for 1% (5%) [10%] signiﬁcant.
Table 2: Growth panel data regressions
Single threshold Double threshold
γˆ γˆ1 γˆ2
Initial GDP per capita (logged) 9.81 9.25 9.80
Bootstrap p-value 0.007 0.296
Bootstrap p-values based on 1000 replications. Threshold values found by grid search in
the central 50% of the distribution of the threshold variable.
Table 3: Testing for linearity
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MODEL 3A 4A 4B
Initial GDP -4.10∗∗∗(0.72) -4.57 ∗∗∗(0.68) -3.99∗∗∗ (0.54)
Investment share 3.05 ∗∗∗(1.03) 3.55∗∗∗ (0.85) 3.29∗∗∗ (0.73)
Years of education 0.17 (0.15) 0.21 (0.14) 0.19 (0.14)
Inﬂation rate -0.13∗∗∗(0.03) -0.13 ∗∗∗(0.03) -0.09 ∗∗∗(0.02)
Government consumption -0.06 (0.09) − −
Openness 0.05∗∗∗(0.02) 0.06∗∗(0.02) 0.03∗(0.01)
Years in the EU×I(y0t ≤ γˆ) 0.08∗∗∗(0.02) 0.09∗∗∗(0.02) 0.06∗∗∗(0.02)
Years in the EU×I(y0t > γˆ) 0.03∗(0.02) 0.04∗∗∗(0.01) 0.03∗∗(0.01)
Ireland dummy − − 3.77∗∗∗ (0.40)
Observations 56 56 56
R2adj (in %) 82.5% 82.6% 93.1%









































































Figure 2: Real GDP per capita dispersion: EU-15 countries 1960-1998
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